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David A. Talan, MD, FACEP, FAAEM, FIDSAa,b,c,
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Los Angeles, CA, USA
bDepartment of Emergency Medicine, Olive View-University of California Los Angeles
Medical Center, Sylmar, CA, USA
cDepartment of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases,
Olive View-University of California Los Angeles Medical Center, Sylmar, CA, USA
The realities of the current world situation dictate that people prepare for
bioterrorism. If an attack were to occur, many people could become ill in
a very short time, putting an enormous, if not overwhelming, strain on local
health care facilities [1]. The emergency department will be among the first
areas affected by a large influx of patients, including the truly sick and the
worried well [2]. The expertise of emergency physicians and infectious dis-
ease specialists will be critical to effective planning and execution of an effec-
tive response to a bioterrorism event. Many principles used to prepare for an
outbreak caused by terrorists would also be applicable to developing a re-
sponse to a natural outbreak, such as an influenza pandemic (eg, Avian in-
fluenza) or severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic [3].
Critical actions in the early stages of an event include identifying the
causative agent and, if necessary, initiating infection control measures to de-
contaminate victims and prevent further spread of the disease [4]. Priority
must be given to protecting health care workers so they can continue to
care for those affected by the attack. Resources must be mobilized to in-
crease surge capacity of emergency departments, hospitals, and clinics [5].
Large-scale vaccination programs may need to be initiated or prophylactic
antibiotics distributed to a large number of individuals within a very short
period.
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146 MORAN et alAlthough many potential problems associated with a bioterrorist attack
seem intimidating, certain preparations could improve the ability to deal
with this event. Physicians should be familiar with their contacts in the local
public health department so that any suspicious illness can be reported
promptly. Specific plans for bioterrorism should be incorporated in disaster
planning [6]. Important topics would include infection control measures,
communication with key agencies such as public health and law enforce-
ment, mobilization of laboratory and pharmacy resources, plans for pro-
cessing large numbers of patients, and increased security.
A wide range of microorganisms could potentially be used as weapons of
mass destruction. The ideal agent for bioterrorism would be capable of pro-
ducing illness in a large percentage of those exposed, be disseminated easily
to expose large numbers of people (eg, through aerosol), remain stable and
infectious despite environmental exposure, and be available to terrorists for
production in adequate amounts. Fortunately, very few agents have these
characteristics.
As part of their preparations for a possible bioterrorism event, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have identified several or-
ganisms that are believed to have the greatest potential for use in this
capacity [7]. Those believed to be top priority for preparations because of
their suitability for weaponization and lethality are classified as category
A agents. Several other organisms (categories B and C) are believed to be
lower priority for specific preparations, but are recognized as possible bio-
terrorism agents. Box 1 lists the agents classified by the CDC as having po-
tential for use in bioterrorism.
The potential for these agents to be turned into weapons varies consider-
ably. Some are highly lethal but designated as lower-priority agents because
they are unstable in the environment or would be difficult to disseminate
effectively. Many of these agents cause nonlethal illness. Although highly
lethal infections would create the most terror in the population, agents
causing nonlethal illness could certainly provide significant social disrup-
tion, which would satisfy terrorist goals.
This article addresses some general issues related to preparing an effective
response to bioterrorism. It also reviews the characteristics of organisms
and toxins that could be used for bioterrorism, including clinical features,
management, diagnostic testing, and infection control (Table 1).Why biological terrorism?
Biological agents have several features that might make them more at-
tractive to terrorists compared with conventional explosives, chemical
weapons, or nuclear weapons. One advantage of biological agents is that
they can inflict devastating damage even when used in minuscule amounts.
They are odorless and easily concealed and are therefore difficult to detect.
Enough botulinum toxin could be carried in one’s pocket to kill millions of
Box 1. Agents with potential for use in biological terrorism
Category A
Easy to disseminate; cause high morbidity and mortality; and
require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capacity
and enhanced disease surveillance
Anthrax
Plague
Smallpox
Hemorrhagic Fevers
Botulism
Tularemia
Category B
Somewhat easy to disseminate; cause moderate morbidity and
low mortality; and require specific enhancements of CDC’s
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance
Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
Brucella species (brucellosis)
Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
Alphaviruses
Venezuelan encephalomyelitis
Eastern and Western equine encephalomyelitis
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
Food or waterborne agents
Salmonella species
Shigella dysenteriae
Escherichia coli O157:H7
Vibrio cholerae
Cryptosporidium parvum
Category C
Emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass
dissemination in the future because of availability; ease of
production and dissemination; and potential for high morbidity
and mortality and major health impact
Nipah virus
Hantaviruses
Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses
Tickborne encephalitis viruses
Yellow fever
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
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Table
Agen f bioterrorism
Disea Clinical presentation Diagnostic tests
Person-to-person
transmission Treatment Vaccine/prophylaxis
Anth Inhalation: fever,
malaise for 1–2 days
followed by
respiratory distress,
shock
May have meningitis.
Highly fatal if
untreated
Cutaneous: red papule
progressing to shallow
ulcer or blister, then
black eschar
CXR may show wide
mediastinum
Gram-positive bacilli in
blood, CSF, or skin
lesion
CSF may be bloody
Blood culture is highest
yield for inhalation
anthrax
No Ciprofloxacin or
Doxycycline plus one
to two other drugs
Other active drugs
include penicillin,
clindamycin,
rifampin,
vancomycin,
imipenem
Levofloxacin or
moxifloxacin
probably also effective
Prophylaxis:
ciprofloxacin or
doxycycline for 60
days (30 days if given
with vaccine)
Bioport vaccine 0.5 mL
SC at 0, 2, 4 weeks, 6,
12, 18 months, then
annual boosters
Botu Cranial nerve palsies
(particularly involving
eyes) progressing to
descending paralysis
Paralysis lasts for weeks
to months.
Diagnosis mostly
clinical
Mouse bioassay using
patient serum takes
several days, not
widely available
No Primarily ventilator
support
Antitoxin can prevent
further progression,
but will not reverse
paralysis
None
Bruce is Fever, chills, anorexia,
malaise
May last weeks to
months
Blood culture (slow-
growing; notify
laboratory if
suspected) or serology
Leukocyte counts
variable
CXR nonspecific
No
Culture specimens
may pose risk to
laboratory workers
doxycycline or
fluoroquinolone plus
rifampin
doxycycline or
fluoroquinolone plus
rifampin for 6 weeks
No vaccine available
1
4
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llos
Cholera Severe watery diarrhea Stool culture with
special media
Rare
Use body fluid
precautions
Fluids, ciprofloxacin
or doxycycline
Prophylaxis:
ciprofloxacin
or doxycycline
Two-dose vaccine, not
highly effective
Glanders
(Burkholderia
mallei)
Tender skin nodules,
septicemia,
pneumonia
Serology (not widely
available)
Blood culture often
negative
Low risk, but
respiratory isolation
recommended
Culture specimens may
pose risk to
laboratory workers
Doxycycline, TMP/
SMX,
chloramphenicol,
fluoroquinolones,
or aminoglycosides
Doxycycline, TMP/
SMX, macrolides, or
fluoroquinolones can
be used for
prophylaxis
No vaccine
Pneumonic
plague
Fever, chills, malaise,
cough, respiratory
distress, hemoptysis,
meningitis, sepsis
Highly fatal if untreated
Gram-negative
coccobacilli in blood,
sputum, lymph node
aspirate
Safety-pin appearance
with Wright or
Giemsa stain
ELISA antigen test and
serology using ELISA
or IFA also available
High risk
Use respiratory droplet
isolation
Streptomycin,
gentamicin,
doxycycline, or
chloramphenicol
Doxycycline or
quinolone for 6 days
Killed vaccine for
bubonic plague, not
effective against
aerosol exposure (no
longer manufactured)
Q fever
(Coxiella
burnetii)
Fever, chills, headache,
sometimes pneumonia
Mortality is low
Serology
Titers may not be
elevated until 2–3
weeks into illness
No
Culture or tissue
specimens may pose
risk to lab workers.
Tetracycline or
doxycycline
Tetracycline or
doxycycline for 5 days
for prophylaxis.
Single dose
inactivated whole cell
vaccine, not licensed
in United States
Ricin Fever, dyspnea,
vomiting, diarrhea,
shock
CXR may show
pulmonary edema
Serology (not widely
available)
No Supportive No vaccine or
prophylaxis available
(continued on next page)
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Table continued )
Disea Clinical presentation Diagnostic tests
Person-to-person
transmission Treatment Vaccine/prophylaxis
Smal Fever, malaise,
headache for 1–2
days, followed by
papular rash
progressing to vesicles
and pustules.
Scabs or pustular fluid
can be forwarded to
CDC through local
public health dept
Can test vesicular fluid
locally to exclude
varicella
High risk
Use strict respiratory
isolation
Identify any possible
contacts
Specimens can pose risk
to laboratory workers
Supportive
Cidofovir may be useful,
but not tested
Vaccinia vaccine can
prevent illness in
contacts up to several
days after exposure
Staph coccal
ent toxin B
Sudden onset of fever,
headache, myalgias,
vomiting, diarrhea,
dry cough
Usually resolves within
a day
Urine antigen, ELISA
of nasal swab (not
widely available)
No Supportive No vaccine
Tular a Fever, malaise,
prostration,
headache, weight loss
and non-productive
cough
CXR may show
infiltrate, hilar
adenopathy, or
effusion
Culture and gram stain
of blood or sputum
may show small,
faintly staining, slow
growing gram-
negative coccobacilli.
Serology usually
positive after 1–2
weeks
No
Culture specimens
may pose risk to
laboratory workers
Streptomycin,
gentamicin,
doxycycline,
chloramphenicol,
or fluoroquinolones
Doxycycline or
ciprofloxacin for 14
days
Investigational live
attenuated vaccine
1
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emi
Venezuelan,
Eastern, or
Western equine
encephalitis
Most have mild
syndrome of fever,
headache, and
myalgia
Rarely progresses
to encephalitis
Serology of CSF
or serum
Only via vector.
Isolation not
necessary
Supportive Inactive vaccines for
VEE, EEE, WEE are
poorly effective
Live vaccine for VEE
has high incidence of
side effects
Viral hemorrhagic
fevers (eg, Ebola)
Fever, prostration,
myalgia, conjunctival
injection, petechial
rash, bleeding
Most are highly fatal
Thrombocytopenia
Identification of virus
requires special
testing at CDC
Moderate risk
Primarily transmitted
through body fluids,
but strict respiratory
isolation is
recommended
Primarily supportive
Ribavirin may be
effective for some,
including Congo-
Crimean HF, Lassa
fever
No prophylaxis or
vaccine available
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; CXR, chest x-ray; EEE, Eastern equine encephalomyelitis;
ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; HF, hemorrhagic fever; IFA, indirect fluorescent antibody; SC, subcutaneous; TMP/SMX, trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole; VEE, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis; WEE, Western equine encephalomyelitis.
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152 MORAN et alpeople if properly dispersed. Because biological agents do not trigger metal
detectors, a terrorist could board a commercial airplane and transport the
agent to any city in the world, where civilian populations are largely unpro-
tected from this kind of attack.
Although access to hazardous biological agents is now more restricted
than in the past, many agents are easy to obtain, certainly much more so
than materials such as plutonium that could be used for other weapons of
mass destruction. A biological weapon may be more difficult to prepare
than a simple pipe bomb, but could often be prepared with only basic micro-
biology skills. Biological agents are also more difficult to trace because there
is a delay between release of the agent and the first development of symp-
toms. A terrorist could release a biological agent in a major metropolitan
area and be on another continent before anyone knows an attack occurred.
Biological agents certainly have the capacity to produce terror. Even if only
a few people actually become ill, an entire city (or even country) could be dis-
rupted if people believe they have been exposed to a deadly organism, such as
Ebola virus or plague. In addition to preparing for the medical emergency,
preparing for the panic and chaos that a bioterrorism attack would cause is
also important. Thousands of people, ill or healthy, could descend on emer-
gency departments and clinics, convinced they are about to die.Probable scenarios and likely problems
One possible scenario for a large-scale biological attack would be aerosol-
ized dispersal of a biological agent, such as from an airplane flying over
a populated area or a small device planted in a ventilation system or crowded
location. Fortunately, very few biological agents remain infectious after
prolonged exposure to air and sunlight, making a large-scale attack difficult.
Because most illnesses caused by biological agents involve incubation pe-
riods, several days are likely to elapse before people become sick. In addi-
tion, because the victims will probably seek medical care at different
facilities, some time may pass before the medical community is even aware
that anything unusual has occurred. The epidemiologic pattern could be an
early sign that an attack has occurred, but with patients presenting at differ-
ent locations, often with relatively nonspecific signs and symptoms, suspect-
ing that an act of terrorism has occurred will be difficult until the number of
victims becomes significant.
In addition to the challenge of treating illnesses, clinicians will be faced
with serious logistical problems if they receive a multitude of victims.
Personnel, medications, and other resources are likely to be insufficient
[8]. Prophylactic therapies are effective against some biological agents. How-
ever, knowing that doxycycline or ciprofloxacin can prevent illness in people
exposed to anthrax will not help when immediate demand exceeds available
supply. The federal government has stockpiles of antibiotics, as do many
large cities, but rapid distribution to large numbers of people will be
153BIOLOGICAL TERRORISMdifficult. Shortages of medicine could exacerbate the panic and chaos caused
by the attack, not only among the victims streaming into emergency depart-
ments and hospitals but also among health care personnel.
Because some of the diseases caused by biological agents can be spread
person-to-person, isolation of victims may be necessary, which will be an-
other formidable challenge, especially with thousands of victims [9]. Many
facilities do not have enough isolation beds even for their current needs
[10], so patients will probably have to be cohorted in designated wards.
Use of portable high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters may also be
useful in an outbreak situation [11].Emergency department surveillance for bioterrorism events
As the front line of clinical medicine, emergency departments are key to
an effective surveillance program [12]. Emergency physicians (and infectious
disease specialists) must continue to be on the lookout for unusual syn-
dromes or clusters of illness that could represent a natural or intentional
outbreak.
Surveillance systems have been greatly expanded in recent years in re-
sponse to concerns about bioterrorism. Many emergency departments are
now part of regional syndromic surveillance systems [13]. Computerized
emergency department information systems that continuously collect infor-
mation have facilitated inclusion of many facilities in these types of systems
and facilitate surveillance with minimal resource commitment. Systems that
require human involvement to actively collect data or enter it into a dedi-
cated system are likely to be abandoned or become less effective after
many years of data collection with no real events [14]. Systems that run con-
tinuously in the background are more efficient and allow generation of data
on the background incidence and variability of different clinical syndromes.
Additional benefits of these systems include improved recognition of natu-
rally occurring outbreaks and facilitation of research with large emergency
department databases. These systems are generally designed so that individ-
ual patient identifiers are not sent to the central database, but public health
reporting is exempted from Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) requirements for patient consent to share information [15].
Although syndromic surveillance systems could be useful in detecting dis-
ease outbreaks, the usefulness of these systems is unproven. Syndromic sur-
veillance has been found to correlate with activity of some common viruses,
such as influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) [16], but the more
difficult task of detecting the first cases of a new outbreak has not been
seen. Even with these surveillance systems in place, the initial detection of
a bioterrorism event may still result from laboratory identification of an-
thrax, smallpox, plague, or Ebola virus. It is unlikely that any syndromic
surveillance system would have detected the United States mail-related an-
thrax cases of 2001 before the first case was identified through laboratory
154 MORAN et altesting of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Unfortunately, microbiologic identifi-
cation in the laboratory usually takes a couple of days, during which the
outbreak may spread beyond easy containment. Investing in rapid labora-
tory testing methods that could be performed during emergency department
evaluation might improve early detection. The real test will be when the next
outbreak or bioterrorism event occurs.
The presence of syndromic surveillance systems does not remove the ob-
ligation of individual physicians to be vigilant for unusual clinical presenta-
tions and notify the local public health department if an infectious disease is
suspected that could pose a threat to public health.Agents with potential use as biological weapons
Some biological agents can be fatal, such as anthrax, botulinum toxin,
and the viruses that cause hemorrhagic fevers, but terrorists could also
meet their goals simply through making many people ill. Diseases such as
brucellosis and tularemia are rarely lethal but can wreak havoc in a commu-
nity if enough people are afflicted.
Fortunately, most biological agents cannot be dispersed effectively
through aerosol. Many are not stable enough to withstand temperature
changes, exposure to sunlight, and drying. Anthrax is often cited as an agent
likely to be used for bioterrorism because spores are stable for many years,
even in extreme environments. The spores are also of an optimal size (1–2
mm), which allows them to be inhaled into the lungs and deposited in the alve-
olar spaces. Most viral agents, such as those that cause hemorrhagic fevers
and encephalitis, are unstable and therefore would be difficult to disperse
through aerosolized large-scale attacks, but smallpox virus can remain viable
aftermany years of storage. Bacterial agents vary in their stability during stor-
age and dispersal. Although toxins such as botulinum toxin and staphylococ-
cal enterotoxin B can remain stable for many years in storage, they can be
difficult to disperse effectively to cause illness in a large population.
The agents designated by the CDC as category A are believed to be the
greatest threat because of ease of dissemination or transmission, high mor-
tality rate, potential major impact on public health, ability to incite panic
and social disruption, and the requirement for additional major public
health preparedness measures (see Box 1).
Category B agents would be moderately easy to disseminate, would cause
moderate morbidity and low mortality, and would require specific enhance-
ments of the CDC’s diagnostic capacity and disease surveillance capabilities.
The agents classified by the CDC as category C are emerging pathogens that
could someday be engineered for mass exposure because of availability, ease
of production and dissemination, and potential for high morbidity and mor-
tality. Preparedness for category C agents requires ongoing research to im-
prove disease detection, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. Which newly
emergent pathogens terrorists might use is impossible to know in advance.
155BIOLOGICAL TERRORISMFor detection and response to these agents, a strong public health infrastruc-
ture is essential. It is also important for physicians to notify the local health
department if unusual patterns of illness are observed.Category A agents
Anthrax
History and significance
Bacillus anthracis could be considered to be the perfect agent for bioter-
rorism. It occurs naturally as a zoonotic disease of persons who handle con-
taminated animal products, such as hair or hides. It forms spores that are
stable over long periods and can withstand exposure to air, sunlight, and
even some disinfectants. Anthrax was studied as a possible weapon by the
United States when it had an active biological weapons program, and has
been weaponized by other countries [17]. Anthrax bacteria are easy to cul-
tivate in the microbiology laboratory and can be readily induced to produce
spores. The Soviet Union produced weaponized anthrax in ton quantities
during the cold war era. An outbreak of inhalational anthrax occurred
near a Soviet bioweapons facility at Sverdlovsk in 1979, resulting in 77 in-
fections and 66 deaths, with some victims becoming ill up to 6 weeks after
exposure [18]. The Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo attempted several at-
tacks with anthrax in the 1990s but were unsuccessful [19].
Anthrax became the most notorious bioterrorism agent after October 4,
2001, when a 63-year-old man died of inhalational anthrax that was traced
to intentional exposure through the United States mail [20,21]. This instance
represented the first inhalation anthrax case in the United States since 1976
[22]. Ultimately, 18 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational and 7 cutaneous) were
confirmed. More than 30,000 people who were potentially exposed received
postexposure prophylaxis, and none developed inhalational anthrax.Clinical presentation
Anthrax can present as three distinct clinical syndromes in humans: cutane-
ous, inhalation, and gastrointestinal. Cutaneous anthrax, the most common
naturally occurring form, is usually spread through contact with infected
animals, particularly cows, sheep, and horses, or their products. Cutaneous
anthrax (Fig. 1) typically produces large black eschars on the skin, but in early
stages may appear as papules that progress to vesicles. Patients may also
experience lymphadenopathy, fever, malaise, and nausea. Local cutaneous
anthrax has a mortality rate of less than 1% if treated but can occasionally
become systemic, with mortality rates approaching 20% [23].
Gastrointestinal anthrax is rare in humans. It is acquired by ingesting in-
adequately cooked meat from infected animals. As the ingested spores ger-
minate, the infected person may develop ulcers in the mouth or esophagus,
or may develop lesions lower in the intestinal tract that caused them to
Fig. 1. Anthrax skin lesion. (Courtesy of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Dr. Philip
S. Brachman.)
156 MORAN et alpresent with abdominal pain, fever, and diarrhea that progresses to a sepsis
syndrome with high mortality.
A far greater threat is posed by the inhalational form of anthrax. This
type of anthrax, also known as woolsorter’s disease when it occurs naturally,
is only rarely seen among wool or tannery workers, but is the form of an-
thrax most likely to be spread through a terrorist attack. Inhalational an-
thrax can be rapidly fatal once symptoms begin.
The victims of the 2001 anthrax attack presented with a fairly consistent
clinical syndrome [24–26]. Symptoms began as a nonspecific prodrome re-
sembling influenza, with malaise, dry cough, and mild fever. This progressed
to chills, sweats, nausea, and vomiting, with development of chest pain and
respiratory distress. Almost all patients had some abnormality on chest ra-
diograph or CT scans, including infiltrates, pleural effusion, or mediastinal
widening. Some patients developed meningitis. Inhalation anthrax can
sometimes present without the usual symptoms of chest pain and shortness
of breath [27]. The illness often progressed to septic shock and death ap-
proximately 24 to 36 hours after the appearance of respiratory distress.
Before the events of 2001 in the United States, almost all cases of inha-
lational anthrax were fatal when treatment was initiated after development
of significant symptoms. The case fatality rate was 45% among the 11 con-
firmed inhalational cases resulting from bioterrorism in the fall of 2001,
largely attributed to earlier and more aggressive supportive care and antibi-
otic therapy [22,28].Diagnosis
Generally, diagnosis must be suspected on clinical grounds for treatment
to be initiated in time to be beneficial. By the time the disease is confirmed
through laboratory tests, many patients will be beyond help [29]. B anthracis
is detectable through Gram stain of the blood and blood culture on routine
media, but often not until the patient is seriously ill. An enzyme-linked im-
munosorbent assay (ELISA) for the anthrax toxin exists, but most hospital
157BIOLOGICAL TERRORISMlaboratories do not have it readily available. The organism may also be iden-
tified in CSF, because approximately 50% of cases have hemorrhagic men-
ingitis [30]. Chest films may show a widened mediastinum and pleural
effusions [31], but those findings are not universal and are usually seen
late in the disease.Infection control precautions
Anthrax does not spread person-to-person, and standard precautions are
recommended. However, persons who present shortly after exposure may
still be contaminated with spores. Any persons coming into direct contact
with a substance alleged to be anthrax spores should simply bathe with
soap and water and store contaminated clothing in a plastic bag, but decon-
tamination procedures for other persons in the area should not be necessary.
Disinfectants such as bleach solutions can be used to decontaminate inani-
mate objects, but are not recommended for skin.Treatment and prophylaxis
The mainstay of treatment is antibiotic therapy, but the regimen should
be started as early as possible to be effective. Although penicillin is usually
regarded as the preferred treatment for naturally occurring anthrax [32],
penicillin-resistant strains are known to occur, and the belief is that terror-
ists would be likely to use a more resistant strain (although this was not the
case in the 2001 attack). Penicillin is not recommended as empiric treatment
until susceptibility of the organism is known. B anthracis is also susceptible
to tetracyclines, erythromycin, chloramphenicol, gentamicin, and fluoroqui-
nolones. Initial empiric treatment with ciprofloxacin or another fluoroqui-
nolone is recommended until susceptibility is known [33]. Supportive
therapy to maintain the airway, replenish fluids, and alleviate shock is
also crucial. Because spores can be dormant for a long time, a 60-day course
of antibiotics is recommended for treating anthrax.
In patients who were exposed to anthrax but are not yet sick, illness and
death can be prevented with prophylactic antibiotics. The CDC recom-
mends ciprofloxacin (500 mg orally twice daily) or doxycycline (100 mg
orally twice daily) as first-line prophylaxis after inhalational exposure to an-
thrax, and for presumptive treatment of mild symptoms after anthrax expo-
sure. If anthrax exposure is confirmed, antibiotics should be continued for at
least 60 days in all exposed individuals, and patients should be followed up
closely after antibiotics are discontinued.
A vaccine for anthrax, derived from an attenuated anthrax strain, has been
licensed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration since 1970 [34]. This
vaccine has been used mostly for military personnel, and might not be
generally available to the public in adequate amounts in the event of a large
biological attack. The vaccine is given repeatedly in a series of six subcutane-
ous injections over 18 months and can cause several adverse effects [35]. It is
not licensed for use against inhalational anthrax exposure, but some limited
158 MORAN et alanimal data suggest protection [36]. Attempts to develop a better vaccine
have met with technical problems and political interference [37].
Several anthrax hoaxes have been perpetrated in many United States cit-
ies, both before and after the 2001 attacks. Public health officials, working
with law enforcement and first-response personnel, should determine the ne-
cessity for decontamination and prophylactic therapy after these alleged ex-
posures. Until the substance can be identified, chemoprophylaxis is
a reasonable precaution if the threat is credible. Good communication
among public health, law enforcement, and clinicians caring for persons
who may have been exposed is critical for appropriate management.Plague
History and significance
Few illnesses carry as many terrifying connotations for the general public
as plague, caused by the gram-negative bacillus Yersinia pestis. The ‘‘Black
Death’’ killed millions of people throughout Europe in the fourteenth cen-
tury. A more recent pandemic originated in China and spread worldwide
at the turn of the twentieth century. Bubonic plague is the most common
naturally occurring form. It is a zoonotic infection spread from the rodent
reservoir to man through the bites of infected fleas. Plague, like anthrax,
also has a pneumonic form, which can be transmitted through inhalation
of droplets spread by cough or, in the event of a terrorist attack, through
inhalation of an aerosol containing Y pestis. As with anthrax, the pneu-
monic form of the disease is far more dangerous. Left untreated, pneumonic
plague is nearly always fatal within 2 days of onset of symptoms.
Plague is more difficult to use as a biological weapon than anthrax be-
cause Y pestis is susceptible to drying, heat, and ultraviolet light. However,
unlike anthrax, secondary cases may result from person-to-person transmis-
sion. Attempts to use plague as a biological weapon date back to the ancient
practice of flinging plague-infected corpses over the walls of cities under
siege. The Japanese attempted to use plague as a biological weapon by re-
leasing infected fleas over cities in Manchuria during World War II, but dis-
semination attempts met with limited success. The United States did not
develop plague as a potential weapon because of its persistence in the envi-
ronment and the possibility of noncombatant and friendly casualties after
an attack. The Soviet Union reportedly developed dry, antibiotic-resistant,
environmentally stable forms of Y pestis that could be disseminated as an
aerosol [38].Clinical presentation
Bubonic plague begins as painful adenopathy several days after the in-
fecting flea bite. Without treatment, the illness progresses within several
days to septicemia. Approximately 5% to 15% of patients will develop a sec-
ondary pneumonia that can spread plague through droplets from coughing.
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in a bioterrorism attack. After an incubation period of 2 to 3 days, patients
who have pneumonic plague typically develop fulminant pneumonia, with
malaise, high fever, cough, hemoptysis, and septicemia with ecchymoses
and extremity necrosis. Findings on chest radiographs are generally typical
of patients who have pneumonia. The disease progresses rapidly, leading to
dyspnea, stridor, cyanosis, and septic shock. Death is normally the result of
respiratory failure and circulatory collapse [39].Diagnosis
A presumptive diagnosis can often be made by identifying Y pestis in
Gram’s, Wayson’s, or Wright-Giemsa stain of blood, sputum, or lymph
node aspirate samples. A definitive diagnosis is generally made with culture
studies. An ELISA test for plague exists, but it is not widely available.
Direct fluorescent antibody staining of the capsular antigen is also available.
Buboes may be aspirated with a small-gauge needle, but incision and drain-
age should not be performed because of the risk for aerosolization of the
organism. The organism has a characteristic bipolar ‘‘safety pin’’
appearance.
Hematologic studies will show leukocytosis with left shift. Bilirubin levels
and serum aminotransferases are often elevated. Antibody studies are not
useful for diagnosing disease during the acute phase. Blood, sputum,
bubo aspirate, and CSF cultures on normal blood agar media are often neg-
ative at 24 hours but positive by 48 hours. The colonies of Y pestis are usu-
ally 1 to 3 mm in diameter and have been described as having a ‘‘beaten
copper’’ or ‘‘hammered metal’’ appearance [36].Infection control precautions
Unlike pulmonary anthrax, pneumonic plague is very contagious. Strict
respiratory isolation is necessary until infected patients have undergone
treatment for at least 3 days. Unfortunately, because the initial presentation
resembles that of severe pneumonia caused by other agents, the actual diag-
nosis may not be known for several days. Therefore, patients who present
with fulminant pneumonia after a suspected biological attack should be
held in respiratory isolation until the cause has been determined.Treatment and prophylaxis
Early treatment with antibiotics, within 24 hours of the appearance of
symptoms, is crucial to the survival of patients who have pneumonic plague.
Streptomycin is the traditional preferred agent but may not be readily avail-
able in some facilities. Doxycycline, gentamicin, ceftriaxone, chloramphen-
icol, and fluoroquinolones should also be effective. Treatment should be
continued for a minimum of 10 days, or for 4 days after clinical recovery.
Patients who have mild illness can be treated with oral doxycycline or
fluoroquinolones.
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doxycycline (100 mg twice daily) or a fluoroquinolone for 6 days. Medical
personnel who practice good infection control precautions should not re-
quire prophylaxis. A recombinant vaccine is under development and seems
to protect against pneumonic plague.Smallpox
History and significance
Smallpox (variola) is a DNA orthopoxvirus that has been a scourge to
humans throughout recorded history. No nonhuman reservoirs or human
carriers exist for smallpox; the disease survives through continual person-
to-person transmission. The first documented epidemic of smallpox was dur-
ing the Egyptian-Hittite war in 1350 BC. The mummy of Ramses V has lesions
that suggest he died of smallpox at the age of 35 years in 1143 BC. Smallpoxwas
used inadvertently as a biological weapon when Cortez introduced it to the
new world in 1520, devastating much of the native population. The English
used smallpox intentionally during the French and Indian war in 1754 when
tainted blankets were distributed to Native Americans, with up to 50% mor-
tality in many tribes. The last case of wild smallpox occurred in Somalia in
1977, although a few small outbreaks have occurred related to laboratory
exposure. The disease was declared eradicated by theWorldHealthOrganiza-
tion (WHO) in 1980 and routine vaccination was stopped soon after.
Because of its propensity for secondary human-to-human transmission,
smallpox is one of the most feared agents that could be unleashed in a bio-
logical attack [40]. Because vaccination is no longer given, most persons to-
day are susceptible to infection. Even those who were vaccinated as children
are likely to be susceptible, because immunity wanes over time.
Stocks of variola virus are supposedly stored at only two WHO-approved
storage facilities: the CDC in Atlanta and the NPO (Scientific and Produc-
tion Association) in the Novosibirsk region of Russia. The Soviet Union
may have developed stockpiles of weaponized smallpox and experimented
with genetic manipulation of the virus [38]. Many believe that some virus
samples may be in the hands of potential terrorists. Because the virus is dif-
ficult to obtain, an intentional smallpox exposure would require extensive
resources that might be out of reach for small groups.Clinical presentation
The incubation period associated with smallpox is approximately
12 days. Smallpox begins with a febrile prodrome a few days before the
rash that may also be accompanied by chills, head and body aches, nausea,
vomiting, and abdominal pain [41]. The characteristic rash develops on the
extremities and spreads centrally. Skin lesions evolve slowly from macules to
papules to vesicles to pustules, with each stage lasting 1 to 2 days. Unlike
chickenpox, all smallpox lesions are at the same stage of development.
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The vesicles or pustules tend to be distributed centrifugally, with the greatest
concentration on the face and distal extremities, including the palms and
soles. Vesicles and pustules are deep-seated, firm, or hard, round, well-cir-
cumscribed lesions; they are sharply raised and feel like small round objects
embedded under the skin (Fig. 2). As they evolve, the lesions may become
umbilicated or confluent and will scab over in 1 to 2 weeks, leaving hypopig-
mented scars.
If a biological attack is not known to have occurred, some early smallpox
cases are likely to be mistaken for chickenpox or other diseases. Chickenpox
differs from smallpox in that the prodrome ismilder, the vesicles are superficial
(ie, easily collapse on puncture) and predominate on the trunk as opposed to
the distal extremities, and active and healing lesions occur simultaneously.
Mortality is reported as approximately 30% overall among unvaccinated
persons, but this reflects historical data in populations without modern med-
ical care. Mortality is higher in infants and elderly individuals, and would
likely be much lower among healthy adults and older children. Death occurs
late in the first week or during the second week of the illness and is caused by
the toxemia induced by the overwhelming viremia. A rare hemorrhagic form
occurs with extensive bleeding into the skin and gastrointestinal tract fol-
lowed almost universally by death within a few days.Diagnosis
The diagnosis of smallpox can be confirmed with electron microscopy or
gel diffusion on vesicular scrapings, but these modalities are not available in
most hospital laboratories. If smallpox is suspected, the laboratory must be
notified to take proper precautions. Smallpox specimens should be handled
under biosafety level 4 conditions. Because testing for varicella virus is usu-
ally available, a vesicular eruption in which varicella cannot be identified
should alert clinicians to possible smallpox. Specimens could then be for-
warded for testing at a specialized laboratory, such as at the CDC or U.S.Fig. 2. Smallpox skin lesions on the trunk. (Courtesy of Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention/James Hicks.)
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Electron microscopy cannot reliably differentiate between variola, vaccinia
(cowpox), and monkeypox. New polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tech-
niques that can rapidly diagnose smallpox may soon be available.Infection control precautions
Identification of even a single case of smallpox would signal an infectious
disease emergency of worldwide significance. Clinicians who suspect small-
pox should immediately contact their local health department and their hos-
pital infection control officer. The local health department will immediately
contact the state public health department and the CDC. The most impor-
tant issue concerning smallpox would be containment of any subsequent
outbreak. If an initial outbreak cannot be contained within a single commu-
nity, an arduous worldwide eradication effort may need to be begun anew.
Smallpox is readily transmitted person-to-person through respiratory
droplets. Because delays in the initial diagnosis are likely, some secondary
exposures may already have occurred by the time smallpox virus is identified
as the cause of illness. Although people are generally not considered infec-
tious until the rash begins, they can shed virus in early stages of the rash be-
fore it can be readily identified as smallpox.
Aggressive quarantine measures will be necessary to prevent further
spread. Anyone who has had direct contact with an infected person should
undergo strict quarantine with respiratory isolation for 17 days. In large-
scale outbreaks, infected individuals may need to be kept at home.
Virions can also remain viable on fomites for up to 1 week. All laundry,
including bedding of infected individuals, should be autoclaved or washed in
hot water with bleach. Standard hospital antiviral surface cleaners are ade-
quate for disinfecting surfaces (eg, counters, floors). Viable virus has been
found in scabs that have been stored for up to 13 years, so meticulous de-
contamination is crucial. If possible, all bodies should be cremated to pre-
vent subsequent exposure of individuals who have had contact with the
deceased, such as funeral home workers.Treatment and prophylaxis
No known effective treatment exists against smallpox. The drug cidofo-
vir, used to treat cytomegalovirus infections, may be active against variola
virus, but no data currently show the drug’s efficacy in humans. Manage-
ment of cases will be largely supportive care.
A vaccine based on the vaccinia virus is effective for immunizing against
smallpox, and has been the mainstay of smallpox control. Unlike many
other vaccines, smallpox vaccine can be effective in preventing disease
even up to several days after exposure. Although stockpiles of the vaccine
were low after routine vaccination ceased in the 1980s, concern about bio-
terrorism has prompted recent development of more modern vaccine
manufacturing methods and creation of new stockpiles.
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who have never been previously vaccinated. Complications from the use of
the current smallpox (vaccinia) vaccine range from the relatively benign
autoinoculation and generalized vaccinia through the more severe progres-
sive vaccinia. The most serious complications include postvaccinial enceph-
alopathy and encephalitis, but fortunately these are rare [43]. Because
vaccinia is a live virus, potential exists for secondary transmission after vac-
cination [44]. In the era of routine smallpox eradication, the only contrain-
dications to vaccination were pregnancy, certain immunocompromised
conditions, and eczema. In the setting of a bioterrorism-related smallpox
outbreak, those believed to have been exposed to the virus would have no
absolute contraindications to vaccination.
In 2002, president Bush announced a program for the vaccination of
health care workers against smallpox. The goal was to vaccinate 500,000
health care workers, but only a very small number actually received the
vaccine. Many health care workers declined vaccination because of concerns
about adverse reactions [45]. An advisory panel recommended against
routine vaccination of emergency physicians because of concern that even
a small risk for adverse reactions outweighed the minimal benefit that could
be expected from smallpox vaccination in the absence of smallpox transmis-
sion anywhere in the world [46]. In the event of even a single smallpox case or
a credible imminent threat, the benefits of smallpox vaccination would
become clearer. Performing a rigorous scientific analysis of the risks and ben-
efits for smallpox vaccination is impossible, because the true risk of a small-
pox attack is unknown. The probability that any individual physician would
be among those to see the first few cases of a smallpox outbreak is extremely
low. Because smallpox vaccine can provide protection up to several days after
exposure, a strategy to ensure timely vaccination of exposed health care
workers and the general public if a smallpox case is identified would avoid
the risk for unnecessary adverse reactions to smallpox vaccine while smallpox
does not exist. Emergency and infectious disease physicians should work with
public health authorities to ensure that these mechanisms are in place.
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the
Health care Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC)
recommend that each acute-care hospital identify health care workers who
can be vaccinated and trained to provide direct medical care for the first
smallpox patients requiring hospital admission and to evaluate and manage
patients who are suspected as having smallpox [47]. When feasible, the first-
stage vaccination program should include previously vaccinated health care
personnel to decrease the potential for adverse events. Additionally, persons
administering smallpox vaccine in this pre-event vaccination program
should be vaccinated.
Smallpox vaccine is administered by using the multiple-puncture tech-
nique with a bifurcated needle packaged with the vaccine and diluent. Ac-
cording to the product labeling, 2 to 3 punctures are recommended for
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pear at the vaccination site after 15 to 20 seconds; if no trace of blood is vis-
ible, an additional 3 insertions should be made by using the same bifurcated
needle without reinserting the needle into the vaccine vial. If no evidence of
vaccine take is apparent after 7 days, the person can be vaccinated again.
Optimal infection-control practices and appropriate site care should prevent
transmission of vaccinia virus from vaccinated health care workers to pa-
tients. Health care personnel providing direct patient care should keep their
vaccination sites covered with gauze in combination with a semipermeable
membrane dressing to absorb exudates and provide a barrier for contain-
ment of vaccinia virus to minimize the risk of transmission. The dressing
should also be covered by a layer of clothing [48].Viral hemorrhagic fevers
History and significance
Like plague, the viral hemorrhagic fevers, which include Ebola and Mar-
burg disease, Lassa fever, and Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, incite fear in the
general public. Many of these viruses cause rapidly progressive illnesses that
carry extremely high mortality rates. Viral hemorrhagic fevers can be spread
in various ways. Lassa fever, for instance, is usually spread through the
ingestion of food contaminated with rodent urine, although person-to-person
transmission through contact with urine, feces, or saliva can also occur.
Yellow fever and dengue (Flaviviridae) are probably the archetypical dis-
eases of this group but are not considered significant bioterrorism threat
agents. Hantavirus (Bunyaviridae) is enzootic in rodents. West Africa’s
Lassa fever, and Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, and Venezuelan hemor-
rhagic fevers (Arenaviridae) are also enzootic in rodents within their respec-
tive areas. The most publicized viral hemorrhagic fevers are the Ebola and
Marburg (Filoviridae) viruses. These viruses produce grotesquely lethal dis-
eases, making them favorites with the popular media. The reservoir and nat-
ural transmission of Ebola and Marburg are unknown, but they are readily
transmittable through infected blood and tissue. Aerosols may be formed
naturally when infectious body fluids are expelled or, in the case of hantavi-
rus, when rodent feces and urine are resuspended from movement in the
area. Laboratory cultures can yield sufficient concentrations of organisms
to provide a credible terrorist weapon if disseminated as an aerosol [36].Clinical presentation
The clinical presentations of different viral hemorrhagic fevers vary, but
all can involve diffuse hemorrhage and bleeding diatheses. The incubation
periods of the hemorrhagic fevers range from 4 to 21 days. The more severe
fevers, such as Ebola, generally have shorter incubation periods. Patients
typically present with a nonspecific prodrome that includes fever, myalgia,
and prostration. On physical examination, the only findings may be con-
junctival injection, mild hypotension, flushing, and scattered petechiae.
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nated intravascular coagulation or elevated levels of liver enzymes or creat-
inine. Within hours or days after the initial presentation, patients will
experience a quick deterioration of their status, followed by mucous mem-
brane hemorrhage and shock, often with signs of neurologic, pulmonary,
and hepatic involvement [49].Diagnosis
Specific tests for some hemorrhagic fevers exist but are not available at
most hospital laboratories. Specific identification requires ELISA detection
of antiviral IgM antibodies or direct culture of the viral agent from blood or
tissue samples. These tests can only be performed at specialized laboratories,
such as those available at CDC or USAMRIID. If the agent remains un-
known, it may be visualized through electron microscopy (Fig. 3) followed
by immunohistochemical techniques. The laboratory should be notified if
Ebola or Marburg viruses are suspected because specimens should be han-
dled under biosafety level 4 precautions.Infection control precautions
Contact precautions are necessary for all health care personnel managing
persons who have hemorrhagic fever [50]. All body fluids should be consid-
ered infectious. In several outbreaks in Africa, hospital personnel were able
to prevent transmission to themselves and other patients simply through
wearing gowns, gloves, and masks. Respiratory isolation, however, may
be necessary for patients who experience massive hemorrhage into the lungs.
Aerosol transmission of hemorrhagic fever has been shown in animal studies
but does not appear to be a significant mode among humans. Under ideal
conditions, each patient should be cared for in a private room. The room
should be entered through an adjoining anteroom that is used for decontam-
ination and hand washing.Treatment and prophylaxis
Good supportive care is the mainstay of therapy for patients who have
any viral hemorrhagic fever. Special care must be taken during fluidFig. 3. Electron micrograph of Ebola virus. (Courtesy of Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention/Cynthia Goldsmith.)
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patients. In addition, because the risk for hemorrhage is high among these
patients, caution is also necessary when placing intravenous and other lines.
For patients who have Lassa fever, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Congo-
Crimean hemorrhagic fever, or Rift Valley fever, the antiviral agent ribavi-
rin may offer some benefit [49].Botulism
History and significance
Botulism is a syndrome caused by exposure to one or more of the seven
neurotoxins produced by the bacillus Clostridium botulinum. The botulinum
toxins are among the most potent toxins in existence. They are 100,000 times
more toxic per microgram than the nerve agent sarin, which was used by the
cult Aum Shinri Kyo in their terrorist attack in the Tokyo subway system in
1995. Theoretically, enough toxin is present in a single gram of crystallized
botulinum toxin to kill more than 1 million people.
Most cases of naturally occurring botulism result from the ingestion of
improperly prepared or canned foods; the disease is also associated, al-
though rarely, with infected wounds or abscesses related to injection drug
use. Terrorists could conceivably contaminate food supplies with the botu-
linum toxins or initiate a large-scale attack by dispersing the toxins through
aerosol over a vast area [51]. Despite efforts to produce an effective botuli-
num toxin weapon, botulism is unlikely to ever be effectively deployed as
a weapon of mass destruction. Aerosol delivery would require large quanti-
ties of toxin at the optimal time, because botulinum toxin quickly degrades
in the environment and is rendered nonlethal within minutes after release.
Municipal water reservoirs are most likely safe from contamination by ter-
rorists, because ton quantities of toxin would be necessary due to the effects
of dilution. Botulinum toxin is not stable for extended periods in water, and
chlorination provides an effective means of destruction.Clinical presentation
Unlike most other bioterrorism-related illness, botulism has a fairly char-
acteristic presentation and therefore can usually be diagnosed from the clin-
ical signs and symptoms alone. The clinical syndrome is similar regardless of
whether the botulinum toxins are ingested or inhaled. Once absorbed, the
toxins block the cholinergic synapses and thereby interfere with neurotrans-
mission. After an incubation period of 1 to 5 days, patients generally present
with neurologic manifestations. Bulbar palsies are extremely common, with
ocular signs such as diplopia and mydriasis. Other bulbar effects may in-
clude dysarthria and dysphagia. Eventually, patients will experience pro-
gressive weakness, followed by skeletal muscle paralysis. The cause of
death is usually respiratory failure. On physical examination, infected
patients are generally afebrile, alert, and oriented. They may have postural
hypotension, and some complain of dry mouth.
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Laboratory testing is generally not helpful. The diagnosis usually must be
made on clinical and epidemiologic grounds. Botulinum toxins are generally
difficult to detect, and most patients do not have antibody responses because
the amount of toxin required to produce clinical symptoms is so small. Some
bioassay tests are available, such as a mouse bioassay, in which the specimen
is injected into mice that are then observed for changes. These assays are
labor-intensive and take several days, and are only available in a few
laboratories.Infection control precautions
Standard universal procedures should be taken whenever a patient pres-
ents with botulism. Patients who may have the toxin on their skin as a result
of aerosol exposure should bathe thoroughly with soap and water and dis-
card their clothes.Treatment and prophylaxis
The mainstay of treatment is hemodynamic and ventilatory support.
Most patients who have botulism will survive if they are given proper ven-
tilatory assistance. Full recovery, however, generally takes several weeks or
months, during which the patient is required to remain on a ventilator, be-
cause new synapses must grow to replace the ones damaged by the botuli-
num toxin. Unfortunately, this strategy would present insurmountable
logistical problems in the event of a terrorist attack, when hundreds or thou-
sands of people may be afflicted with respiratory failure. Mechanical venti-
lators will be in short supply, and bag-ventilation would be impractical for
weeks to months. The sudden demand for limited resources could make
proper care for the many victims nearly impossible.
A trivalent equine botulinum antitoxin is available from the CDC and
some state health departments [52]. Unfortunately, it is effective only in pre-
venting further deterioration; it will not reverse muscle weakness that has
already developed. It would not be available in adequate amounts to treat
the number of people resulting from a large-scale exposure. Because the an-
titoxin is a horse serum product, skin testing for horse serum sensitivity is
recommended before the drug is administered. A newer human botulism im-
munoglobulin has been shown to be effective for infant botulism [53], and
would probably also be effective for preventing progression of botulism re-
lated to bioterrorism events.Tularemia
History and significance
Otherwise known as rabbit or deer fly fever, tularemia is usually con-
tracted after contact with infected animals or from the bites of infected deer-
flies, mosquitoes, or ticks. It can also be caused by the ingestion of
contaminated food and water and the inhalation of contaminated air. The
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ative coccobacillus. F tularensis remains viable for weeks in water, soil, car-
casses, and hides, and for years in frozen meat. It is easily killed by heat and
disinfectants but can survive for months in temperatures of freezing and
below.
F tularensis was weaponized by the United States in the 1950s and 1960s
during the offensive biowarfare program, and other countries are also sus-
pected to have weaponized the organism. F tularensis could potentially be
stabilized for weaponization and produced in either a wet or dried form
for delivery in a terrorist attack [54]. As few as 10 to 50 organisms may cause
disease if inhaled or injected intradermally; however, approximately 108 or-
ganisms are required to cause infection after oral ingestion.Clinical presentation
Tularemia can manifest in several ways, depending on the route of infec-
tion. Ulceroglandular tularemia resulting from contact with infected ani-
mals is the most common form, accounting for up to 85% of cases. This
form manifests as fever, chills, headache, malaise, an ulcerated skin lesion,
and painful regional lymphadenopathy. Skin ulcers typically begin in the
area of exposure to the organism, most commonly on the hands.
Typhoidal tularemia, which is caused by infectious aerosols, is the form
most likely to appear after a terrorist attack. After an incubation period
of 2 to 10 days, most victims present with fever, headache, chills, myalgia,
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. They may also have cough and other respi-
ratory symptoms. Initial laboratory evaluations are generally nonspecific.
Approximately 80% of patients will have pneumonia. These nonspecific
signs and symptoms would make a specific diagnosis of tularemia difficult
in the event of a terrorist attack, leading to increased mortality. Case fatality
rates of untreated naturally acquired typhoidal cases is approximately 35%,
compared with 1% to 3% for appropriately treated cases.Diagnosis
Tularemia can be diagnosed through culturing the organism from blood,
ulcers, conjunctival exudates, sputum, gastric washings, and pharyngeal ex-
udates, although culture is difficult and the yield is low. The organism grows
poorly on standard media but can be grown on media containing cysteine or
other sulfhydryl compounds (eg, glucose cysteine blood agar, thioglycollate
broth). The laboratory should be notified if tularemia is suspected, because
the organism represents a hazard to laboratory personnel. Culture should
only be attempted using biosafety level 3 precautions.
Tularemia is usually diagnosed serologically using bacterial agglutination
or ELISA. Antibodies to F tularensis appear within the first week of infec-
tion, but levels adequate to allow confidence in the specificity of the sero-
logic diagnosis (titer O1:160) do not appear until more than 2 weeks after
infection [55]. Cross-reactions can occur with other organisms, such as
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ter infection, serologic diagnosis depends on a fourfold or greater increase in
the tularemia tube agglutination or microagglutination titer during the
course of the illness. Titers are usually negative during the first week of in-
fection, become positive during the second week in 50% to 70% of cases,
and achieve a maximum level in 4 to 8 weeks [56].Infection control precautions
Although person-to-person transmission of tularemia is rare, health care
personnel should follow standard universal precautions whenever managing
patients who have the disease.Treatment and prophylaxis
The traditional treatment for patients who have tularemia is a 10- to 14-
day course of streptomycin, but this agent may not be readily available in
the event of an attack. Other agents that have proven effective against the
disease include gentamicin, tetracycline, chloramphenicol, and fluoroquino-
lones [57]. Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline could be used for postexposure pro-
tection against tularemia, based on in vitro susceptibilities. A 2-week course
should be effective as postexposure prophylaxis when given within 24 hours
of aerosol exposure.Category B agents
Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
History and significance
Not all potential agents of bioterrorism cause fulminant, life-threatening
illnesses; some produce milder, longer-lasting illnesses. Q fever is a good ex-
ample of the latter. The disease has a long incubation period, after which it
tends to produce nonspecific, fairly mild symptoms. Only very rarely is it fa-
tal. However, a terrorist group could still disrupt and terrify a community
by causing nonfatal illness.
Q fever is an acute or chronic zoonotic illness caused by the rickettsial
organism Coxiella burnetii. The illness was described during a 1935 outbreak
in Queensland, Australia, and was called Q (query) fever because the origin
was not currently identified.
Q fever occurs worldwide and usually results from exposure to infected
livestock such as sheep, cattle, or goats. Infected animals are usually asymp-
tomatic; parturient animals may have large numbers of organisms present in
the placenta, resulting in environmental contamination. Humans typically
become infected through inhaling aerosols containing C burnetii. The organ-
ism proliferates in the lung and then spreads through the bloodstream.
C burnetii has a spore-like form that can survive for weeks or months in
the environment. The organism can survive heat and drying and can be
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mans; a single viable organism is adequate to cause infection. Because of
these characteristics, it is considered suitable for use as a bioweapon.Clinical presentation
The presenting symptoms of Q fever are nonspecific. In fact, many infec-
tions appear to be asymptomatic. In those who become ill, the most com-
mon findings are fever, chills, and headache. Onset may be sudden or
gradual, and the incubation period can vary considerably from approxi-
mately 10 days up to several weeks. Most patients have a self-limited febrile
illness that resolves within 1 or 2 weeks. Overall mortality is low: 2.4% in
one large series of hospitalized patients [58]. However, many patients report
malaise and fatigue that persist for months.
Q fever maymanifest as pneumonia.Many patients who have Q fever have
radiographic evidence of pneumonia but no cough. If cough is present, it is
usually nonproductive. Severe headache is frequently associated with Q fever
pneumonia. Hepatic transaminase levels are frequently elevated, but the pe-
ripheral white blood cell count is usually normal. Some patients have a rapidly
progressing pneumonia syndrome similar to Legionnaire’s disease. Although
Q fever pneumonia may have various radiographic appearances, multiple
rounded opacities (often pleural-based) are a suggestive pattern. Pleural effu-
sion (usually small) is found in approximately one third of cases [59].
Q fever can also have various chronic manifestations, including endocar-
ditis, intravascular infection, hepatitis, and osteomyelitis. Endocarditis typ-
ically involves abnormal or prosthetic valves but can sometimes develop in
normal valves. C burnetii will not grow in routine blood cultures, so culture-
negative endocarditis is a typical clinical picture. Liver involvement may
manifest as acute hepatitis or as a fever of unknown origin, with granulomas
found on liver biopsy.Diagnosis
Most laboratories do not have the facilities to isolate C burnetii. Serologic
testing through complement fixation, indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) or
ELISA is the mainstay of diagnosis for Q fever. However, titers may not be
elevated until 2 to 3 weeks into the illness. Convalescent titers characteristi-
cally show a fourfold increase 2 or 3 months after onset of illness.Infection control precautions
Human-to-human spread of Q fever does not seem to occur, and there-
fore isolation is not required. However, tissues from patients who have Q
fever may pose a threat to laboratory workers and should be processed un-
der biosafety level 3 conditions.Treatment and prophylaxis
Several antibiotics have activity against C burnetii and seem to shorten
the duration of illness. Antibiotics also seem to prevent illness when given
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for treatment. Other drugs that have been used include macrolides, quino-
lones, chloramphenicol, rifampin, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole.
The optimal duration of therapy is unclear. Treatment for uncomplicated
infections or prophylaxis is generally given for 5 to 7 days. Prolonged com-
bination treatment (eg, doxycycline plus a quinolone or rifampin) is usually
given for chronic infection such as endocarditis. A vaccine against Q fever is
being used in Australia but is not licensed in the United States [61].Brucella species (brucellosis)
History and significance
Brucellosis is a zoonotic infection that can have various manifestations in
humans. Brucella species are small, aerobic, slow-growing gram-negative
coccobacilli. The genus Brucella is divided into several species on the basis
of preferred animal hosts and other features. The main manifestations in an-
imals are abortion and sterility. Humans can become infected from (1) direct
contact with animal secretions through breaks in the skin, (2) infected aero-
sols, or (3) ingestion of unpasteurized dairy products. Brucellae are faculta-
tive intracellular pathogens, and replication and spread seem to occur
through lymphatics and hematogenous dissemination. Brucella species can
survive for many weeks in soil or water. B suis was weaponized by the
United States in the 1940s and 1950s; other countries are also suspected
to have weaponized brucellae. Brucella organisms are highly infectious
when aerosolized; consequently, inhalation will be the most likely route of
infection during a terrorist attack. The organism could be spread as a slurry
in bomblets or as a dry aerosol [61].Clinical presentation
Clinical symptoms of brucellosis are varied and nonspecific. Like Q fever,
brucellosis can begin insidiously, with an influenza-like illness. Symptoms
generally begin 2 to 4 weeks after exposure, but the incubation period can
be 8 weeks or more. The infection tends to localize in tissues with large num-
bers of macrophages, such as lung, spleen, liver, central nervous system
(CNS), bone marrow, and synovium. Symptoms vary because of the wide-
spread nature of infection. In most instances, the intermittent fever phase
lasts for several weeks, followed by a period of remission, during which
symptoms may wane or disappear altogether. The fever and other symptoms
then recur. This pattern of periodic febrile waves and remission can last for
months or even years. Although chronic cases of brucellosis can be very de-
bilitating, the disease is rarely fatal. Fever, chills, sweats, anorexia, head-
ache, and malaise are common manifestations. Although patients may
complain of many symptoms, physical findings are often lacking.
Liver involvement is common, although transaminase levels are usually
only mildly elevated. Hepatic granulomas are characteristic of some species,
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arthritis, osteomyelitis, and tenosynovitis. Large weight-bearing joints (eg,
sacroiliac, hips, knees, ankles) are most commonly involved. Hematologic
findings include anemia, leukopenia, and thrombocytopenia. The rare seri-
ous complications of brucellosis include endocarditis and CNS infection. Al-
though depression and difficulty concentrating are common complaints in
patients who have brucellosis, direct invasion of the CNS (eg, meningitis,
encephalitis) occurs in fewer than 5% of infected individuals [62]. Endocar-
ditis occurs in fewer than 2% of cases but is responsible for most deaths.Diagnosis
Brucellosis can be diagnosed through isolation of the organism in cul-
tures or by serology. Because brucellae are slow-growing, the laboratory
should be alerted to hold culture specimens for at least 4 weeks if brucellosis
is suspected. Cultures of bone marrow have a higher yield than blood. Rapid
bacterial identification systems used by many laboratories may reduce the
time to isolation, but misidentification of brucellae with these systems has
been reported [63]. A presumptive diagnosis can be made on the basis of
high or rising antibody titers. Most patients who have infection have titers
higher than 1:160. Febrile agglutinin tests are not adequately sensitive. PCR
techniques may soon yield a rapid method of diagnosing brucellosis.Infection control precautions
Because human-to-human transmission seems to be rare, isolation is not
necessary. However, the organisms are highly infectious through aerosol,
and culture specimens may pose a threat to laboratory workers. The labo-
ratory should be notified if brucellosis is suspected; laboratory biosafety
level 2 or 3 precautions are recommended. Contact isolation should be
used for patients who have open draining lesions.Treatment and prophylaxis
Although most patients will recover without treatment, antibiotics reduce
the severity and duration of illness. Many antibiotics have in vitro activity,
but those with good intracellular penetration are most effective clinically.
Combination treatment is most effective. Doxycycline plus rifampin for 6
weeks is the most commonly used regimen. Gentamicin or streptomycin is
sometimes included in the regimen for more severe infections such as endo-
carditis. No effective human vaccine is available for brucellosis.
Antibiotics will unlikely prevent disease if given before the onset of symp-
toms, although the optimal regimen is unknown. Because of the long incuba-
tion period, the opportunity for prophylaxis is greater with brucellosis than
for some other agents with shorter incubation periods, such as anthrax or tu-
laremia. An economic model estimated that the economic impact of a bioter-
rorist attack with brucellosis on a population of 100,000 people would be
approximately $478 million. Timely intervention with antibiotic prophylaxis
could reduce the economic impact through preventing illness [64].
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History and significance
Glanders is a disease of horses, mules, and donkeys caused by the bacte-
rium Burkholderia mallei (previously known as Pseudomonas mallei). The in-
fection can also occur in humans and other animals. Human infection is rare
but can be severe. B mallei is a nonmotile, gram-negative bacillus. The route
of naturally occurring infection is unclear, but infection is believed to occur
through broken skin or nasal mucosa contaminated with infected material.
Infection also seems to occur through an aerosol route, as evidenced by
infections in laboratory workers from routine handling of cultures [65,66].
Its ability to cause serious illness and infect through aerosol indicate that
B mallei may have potential use in bioterrorism. In fact, this organism
has been used as a bioweapon; animals were deliberately infected with
glanders during World War I [67].
Melioidosis is a human illness caused by B pseudomallei, which is clini-
cally similar to glanders but does not seem to be particularly infectious
through aerosol.Clinical presentation
Infection from inoculation through a break in the skin typically results in
a tender nodule with local lymphangitis. Inoculation of the eyes, nose, and
mouth can result in mucopurulent discharge with ulcerating granulomas.
With systemic invasion, a generalized papular or pustular eruption is
frequent. This septicemic form is often fatal within 7 to 10 days. The in-
cubation period after infection through inhalation (most likely in
a bioterrorism event) is approximately 10 to 14 days. The most common
manifestations include fever, myalgias, headache, and pleuritic chest pain.
Lymphadenopathy or splenomegaly may be present. The disease often man-
ifests as pneumonia [65].Diagnosis
The organism can be difficult to identify. Blood cultures are usually neg-
ative, except in the terminal stages of septicemia. Automated bacterial iden-
tification systems used in many laboratories may not correctly identify
B mallei. Serologic tests will usually show a rise in titers by the second
week, but agglutination titers are not very specific. Complement fixation ti-
ters are more specific but less sensitive. Serologic tests are not standardized
or widely available. B mallei and B pseudomallei cannot be distinguished
morphologically, but a PCR procedure has been developed that can differ-
entiate the two [68].Infection control precautions
Because person-to-person transmission can occur, isolation is indicated.
Culture specimens pose a threat to laboratory personnel, and therefore
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precautions are indicated.Treatment and prophylaxis
The paucity of human cases has prevented any systematic study of treat-
ment. Sulfadiazine has been effective in experimental animal infections and
humans. Agents known to be effective for human melioidosis include tetra-
cyclines, trimethoprim- sulfamethoxazole, amoxicillin-clavulanate, and
chloramphenicol. In vitro, B mallei is susceptible to aminoglycosides, mac-
rolides, quinolones, doxycycline, piperacillin, ceftazidime, and imipenem
[69]. No vaccine is available.Alphaviruses
History and significance
Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis and Eastern and Western Equine
Encephalomyelitis (VEE, EEE, and WEE, respectively) are mosquito-borne
viral infections found in North and South America. EEE occurs primarily
along the eastern and gulf coasts of the United States. Although human ill-
ness is rare, the case-fatality rate can be as high as 50% to 70%. WEE vi-
ruses are found primarily west of the Mississippi. During an epidemic,
WEE infection rates are much higher than for EEE, but the case fatality
rate is much lower (approximately 3%–4%). Outbreaks occur primarily in
the summer, and equine cases greatly outnumber human cases. VEE occurs
in many areas of South and Central America, and outbreaks have occurred
in North America.
These alphaviruses are limited in their geographic distribution by the
mosquito vector, and therefore finding these viruses outside the endemic
areas should arouse suspicion of an intentional release. All of these viruses
are highly infectious through aerosol. Because they are stable during storage
and can be produced in large amounts with unsophisticated equipment, they
are regarded as having potential for weaponization [61].Clinical presentation
Most infections with these viruses result in nonspecific symptoms of fe-
ver, headache, and myalgia. Only a fraction of individuals infected will ex-
perience progression to frank encephalitis. Viral encephalitides should be
included in the differential diagnosis of nonspecific viral syndromes after
a possible bioterrorism event. Reports of ill horses in the vicinity would ob-
viously suggest an equine encephalitis virus. Whether aerosol exposure, as in
a bioterrorism event, would lead to a pattern of symptoms different from
that of the mosquito-borne illness is unknown.
EEE is the most severe of these infections, with high mortality rates and
high rates of neurologic sequelae [70]. WEE and VEE have lower rates of
progression to neurologic symptoms. Infants and elderly individuals are
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the initial viral prodrome is followed by confusion and somnolence, which
may progress to coma. Peripheral blood counts often show leukopenia in
the early stages of illness, which can progress to leukocytosis. CSF protein
is elevated, and lymphocytic pleocytosis is usually present.Diagnosis
Virus can sometimes be isolated from blood during the early stages of ill-
ness, but viremia has usually resolved by the time symptoms of encephalitis
develop. Virus can sometimes be isolated from CSF or postmortem brain
tissue. The specific viral pathogen is generally identified through serologic
testing of the CSF or serum (or both), but these results will not be available
until later. Virus-specific IgM antibodies can be detected with ELISA [71].
Subsequent testing of convalescent serum may confirm the diagnosis but
will not be helpful in initial management. Physicians should attempt to ob-
tain enough CSF for specialized testing if encephalitis is a diagnostic possi-
bility. Experimental PCR assays have been developed for several viral
pathogens and will likely become more standardized and readily available
in the future.Infection control precautions
Isolation is not necessary since person-to-person transmission does not
occur.Treatment and prophylaxis
No specific treatment for these viral encephalitides. Treatment is support-
ive. Inactivated vaccines are available for EEE, WEE, and VEE, but none is
widely used because of problems with poor immunogenicity and need for
multiple doses. A live attenuated vaccine is available for VEE but has
a high incidence of side effects, such as fever, headache, and malaise. Newer
vaccines using recombinant technology are in development.Ricin toxin from ricinus communis (castor beans)
History and significance
Ricin is a protein toxin derived from the castor bean plant. Castor beans
are easily obtained worldwide, and it is relatively easy to extract the toxin.
One million tons of castor beans are processed annually in the production of
castor oil worldwide; the waste mash from this process is approximately 5%
ricin by weight. Ricin was used in the assassination of Bulgarian exile
Georgi Markov in London in 1978. Markov was attacked with a specially
engineered weapon disguised as an umbrella, which implanted a ricin-con-
taining pellet into his leg [72].
Ricin toxin is somewhat less toxic by weight compared with botulinum
toxin or staphylococcal enterotoxin B, but can be produced in large
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It is toxic through several routes of exposure, including respiratory and
gastrointestinal.Clinical presentation
Ricin toxin inhibits protein synthesis. When inhaled as an aerosol, the
toxin can produce symptoms within 4 to 8 hours. Typical symptoms include
fever, chest tightness, cough, dyspnea, nausea, arthralgias, and profuse
sweating. With a sublethal dose of toxin, the symptoms should improve
within several hours. In animal studies, lethal doses produced necrosis of
the respiratory tract and alveolar filling in 36 to 72 hours after exposure.
When ingested, ricin causes severe gastrointestinal symptoms, such as
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. With large toxin exposures, this may be as-
sociated with gastrointestinal hemorrhage and hepatic, splenic, and renal ne-
crosis. Death can occur from hypovolemic shock [73]. Ricin toxin may also
cause disseminated intravascular coagulation, microcirculatory failure, and
multiple organ failure if given intravenously in laboratory animals.Diagnosis
Diagnosis of ricin poisoning would be primarily clinical and epidemio-
logic. ELISA testing can be performed on serum, but this modality would
not be widely available in most laboratories [74]. Acute and convalescent
sera could be obtained from survivors to measure antibody response for di-
agnostic confirmation.Infection control precautions
This toxin-mediated syndrome has no potential for person-to-person
spread. Patients who are grossly contaminated may need to change their
clothes and wash with soap and water.Treatment and prophylaxis
Treatment of ricin poisoning is supportive. Respiratory support may be
needed for pulmonary edema. Gastric decontamination with charcoal may
have somebenefit for ingestions.Fluidsmaybe required to replace gastrointes-
tinal losses. Vaccines against ricin toxin are currently under development [75].Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
History and significance
Clostridium perfringens is an anaerobic, gram-positive, spore-forming ba-
cillus. This ubiquitous organism is present in soil throughout the world and
has been found in the stool of virtually every vertebrate organism ever tested
[76]. Clostridium species can produce various toxins, and these are responsi-
ble for illness. Enterotoxin-producing strains of C perfringens type A cause
a mild form of food poisoning that is common worldwide. Large amounts of
this toxin could be produced for intentional exposure.
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Within hours of exposure, gastrointestinal symptoms such as watery di-
arrhea, nausea, and abdominal cramps will develop. Fever is rare. Sponta-
neous resolution typically occurs within a day, and fatalities are rare. The
C perfringens enterotoxin can act as a superantigen and is a potent stimula-
tor of human lymphocytes. Large exposure through aerosol or ingestion
could lead to more severe systemic symptoms.Diagnosis
Enterotoxin can be detected in stool with latex agglutination or ELISA,
but these tests are not widely available. Cultures are not of value because
C perfringens is normally found in stool.Infection control precautions
Because this is a toxin-mediated syndrome, no potential exists for person-
to-person spread.Treatment and prophylaxis
Treatment is supportive.Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
History and significance
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) is a common cause of food poison-
ing caused by a heat-stable toxin produced by the ubiquitous organism
Staphylococcus aureus. The toxin is relatively stable in aerosols (more stable
than botulinum toxin); even low doses can cause symptoms when inhaled.
Although rarely fatal, a high percentage of those exposed could become se-
riously ill within a few hours. It could also be used to contaminate food or
water supplies.Clinical presentation
SEB is a potent activator of T cells, and most of the clinical manifesta-
tions are mediated by the patient’s own immune system. Symptoms begin
3 to 12 hours after exposure. Typical symptoms are high fever, headache,
myalgia, prostration, and dry cough. Vomiting and diarrhea may result
from swallowed toxin. Patients may be incapacitated for up to 2 weeks.
In severe cases, pulmonary edema or adult respiratory distress syndrome
may develop. In rare cases, death occurs from dehydration.Diagnosis
The diagnosis of SEB intoxication is primarily clinical and epidemiologic.
Practically speaking, a specific diagnosis of SEB would be very difficult. The
symptoms are nonspecific and overlap with many other clinical syndromes,
including those of other bioterrorism agents. Because of the short
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in a localized area compared with many other bioterrorism agents. The
toxin may be identified with ELISA of nasal swabs after aerosol exposure,
or the antigen can be detected in urine [61]. Neither of these tests is readily
available.Infection control precautions
Because this is a toxin-mediated syndrome, no potential exists for person-
to-person spread. However, if patients are grossly contaminated after a re-
cent exposure, health care workers could be exposed to the toxin on skin or
clothing. A simple change of clothes and shower with soap and water would
provide adequate decontamination.Treatment and prophylaxis
Treatment is supportive. Some patients may require rehydration for fluid
losses, although care must be taken to avoid pulmonary edema in more se-
vere intoxications. Ventilatory support may be required in severe cases. Vac-
cines are under development.Food-borne and waterborne pathogens
History and significance
Although most agents considered more likely to be used for bioterrorism
would be disseminated through aerosol, food- or waterborne agents could
be used. In fact, Shigella and Salmonella have already been used in inten-
tional exposures in the United States. Shigella was used to contaminate do-
nuts given to fellow workers by a disgruntled employee and caused 12 cases
of diarrhea [77]. Salmonella was used by a religious commune in Oregon to
contaminate local salad bars, leading to more than 750 cases of gastroenter-
itis [78].
Food- and waterborne agents would be less likely than airborne agents to
be involved in a large-scale attack, because it is more difficult to expose large
numbers of people. Standard treatment of municipal water supplies would
preclude survival of most biologic agents and inactivates most biological
toxins. Food-borne outbreaks are generally limited to small groups of peo-
ple. However, more centralized processing of foods for mass marketing may
increase the potential for widespread food-borne outbreaks, as has been
shown by multistate outbreaks of Listeria and Salmonella resulting from
contamination in food-processing facilities [79,80].
Salmonella species, Shigella dysenteriae, Escherichia coli O157:H7, and
Vibrio cholerae are all bacterial causes of food-borne gastroenteritis. Salmo-
nella, Shigella, and E coli all cause illness sporadically in the United States
[81]. Cholera is a cause of severe gastroenteritis in developing countries but
is only occasionally imported into the United States.
Cryptosporidium parvum is a protozoal organism that is also associated
with diarrhea. C parvum can be spread by contamination of food or water
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resistant to chlorine, C parvum can survive in swimming pools and munici-
pal water supplies. C parvum was associated with a massive outbreak caused
by contamination of the municipal water supply in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
in 1993 [82]. More than 400,000 people became ill, resulting in more than
40,000 health care visits and 4000 hospitalizations.Clinical presentation
These infections generally present with diarrhea, sometimes associated
with nausea, vomiting, fever, and abdominal cramps. The incubation period
is approximately 1 to 3 days. Gastroenteritis caused by Shigella is often as-
sociated with blood or mucus in the stool. Salmonella typhi and S paratyphi
can produce a typhoidal syndrome, with gradual onset of fever, headache,
malaise, myalgias, and constipation. Diarrhea is uncommon. Cholera is as-
sociated with severe watery diarrhea, which can cause death from dehydra-
tion within hours.
E coli O157:H7 is notable for being associated with bloody diarrhea, but
Salmonella or Shigella can also be associated with this condition [83]. E coli
O157:H7 produces a Shiga toxin associated with development of hemolytic
uremic syndrome (HUS) [84]. HUS is characterized by hemolytic anemia,
thrombocytopenia, and renal insufficiency. Approximately 6% of people
with bloody diarrhea caused by E coli O157:H7 will develop HUS, but
the rate is higher (about 10%) in children younger than 10 years. The mor-
tality rate associated with HUS is 3% to 5%.
C parvum typically causes watery diarrhea associated with crampy ab-
dominal pain. The incubation period is usually approximately a week but
can sometimes extend up to several weeks. Illness can sometimes last for
many weeks.Diagnosis
Routine stool cultures for enteropathogens will identify agents such as
Salmonella and Shigella. Many laboratories do not routinely test for
E coli O157:H7 and other Shiga toxin–producing strains of E coli, so the
laboratory should be notified if this agent is suspected (eg, afebrile patient
with bloody diarrhea). E coli O157:H7 appears as a colorless colony on sor-
bitol MacConkey agar. These colonies can be tested for O157 antigen using
a commercial kit. Stool cultures can also be tested directly for Shiga toxin
using a commercial kit. V cholerae requires special media to grow, so the
laboratory should be notified if cholera is suspected. C parvum can be iden-
tified with a modified acid-fast stain of stool or with fluorescent stain.Infection control precautions
Standard body fluid precautions should prevent spread of these organ-
isms. Patients should be instructed to be extra vigilant about handwashing
after using the bathroom.
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Treatment of these infections is generally supportive. Most infections
with Salmonella and Shigella are self-limited and will resolve without specific
treatment within a few days. Antimicrobial treatment may reduce the dura-
tion and severity of symptoms. Salmonella is susceptible to quinolones,
azithromycin, and third-generation cephalosporins. Resistance to trimetho-
prim-sulfamethoxazole seems to be increasing, and antimicrobial-resistant
organisms seem likely to be used in a bioterrorism event. Shigella is suscep-
tible to fluoroquinolones, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and azithromy-
cin. E coli O157:H7 infection should not be treated with antimicrobials or
antimotility agents, because treatment may increase toxin production and
thereby increase the risk for hemolytic uremic syndrome. Treatment of chol-
era typically requires large amounts of intravenous fluids and replacement
of electrolytes. Oral administration of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is effec-
tive for cholera. No antimicrobial agent has proven efficacy for C parvum
infection, although paromomycin and azithromycin have been used in pa-
tients who have AIDS experiencing chronic diarrhea caused by this
organism.Category C agents
Nipah virus
History and significance
In April 1999, an outbreak of 257 cases of encephalitis (100 fatal) was re-
ported in Malaysia [85]. A previously unrecognized paramyxovirus called
Nipah was identified as the cause. Pigs appeared to be the primary source
of human infection in this outbreak.Clinical presentation
Patients in the reported outbreak presented with fever, headache, and
myalgias and eventually developed signs of meningitis or encephalitis. A
few patients had respiratory symptoms.Diagnosis
Identification of Nipah virus requires specialized testing in a reference
laboratory, such as the CDC or USAMRIID. IgM antibodies can be de-
tected in blood and CSF. Better diagnostic tests for this recently discovered
agent are under development [86].Infection control precautions
Person-to-person spread of Nipah virus has not been identified. However,
virus has been isolated from respiratory secretions and urine of patients in-
fected with Nipah virus [87]. Pending further study of the potential for per-
son-to-person spread, strict isolation would be prudent for patients
suspected of being infected with this virus.
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Treatment is primarily supportive. A small, open-label trial conducted
during the outbreak in Malaysia showed a 36% reduction of mortality
among patients who had acute Nipah virus encephalitis with ribavirin [88].Hantaviruses
History and significance
Hantaviruses are in the family Bunyaviridae, which also comprises Cali-
fornia encephalitis virus and several hemorrhagic fever viruses. Hantavi-
ruses are found in many rodent species worldwide. Hantavirus and several
related viruses cause a syndrome of fever, thrombocytopenia, and renal in-
sufficiency; the disease occurs primarily in Eastern Asia. Sin nombre virus
(SNV), a similar virus, was identified as the cause of several cases of severe
pulmonary edema and shock (hantavirus pulmonary syndrome) in the
southwestern United States in 1993 [89]. Aerosols of virus-contaminated ro-
dent urine or feces seemed to be the mechanism of transmission in these
cases. Because aerosol transmission is possible, the virus is believed to
have potential for weaponization.Clinical presentation
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) begins with a viral prodrome of
fever and myalgias. Respiratory symptoms, including cough and dyspnea,
begin after several days. Laboratory investigations may reveal an elevated
hematocrit, leukocytosis, mild thrombocytopenia, and elevated liver trans-
aminases. In severe cases, the illness progresses to pulmonary edema, with
respiratory failure and shock [90].Diagnosis
Hantaviruses are difficult to isolate in viral culture. In the acute phase of
the disease, the clinical diagnosis may be confirmed through serology or
PCR. ELISA and IFA are available to identify antibody to hantaviruses
[91]. An immunoblot assay is also available.Infection control precautions
Person-to-person transmission of naturally occurring SNV in the United
States has not been identified. However, it has been identified in Argentina,
including a fatal infection in a physician who also transmitted the virus to his
family [92,93]. Because of the potential for person-to-person spread of a virus
used in an intentional attack, using respiratory isolation would be prudent for
persons who have suspected HPS related to a bioterrorism event.Treatment and prophylaxis
Treatment of HPS is primarily supportive. Extracorporeal membrane ox-
ygenation has been used in severe cases [94]. An open-label trial of ribavirin
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ing. Vaccines are under development.Other agentsSeveral arthropod-borne viruses might have potential for use as biowea-
pons, including the flaviviruses that cause yellow fever and tick-borne en-
cephalitis. Person-to-person transmission of flaviviruses does not appear
to occur, except through the arthropod vectors.
Yellow fever is amosquito-borne virus of historical interest because of large
outbreaks that played a role in development of the Americas. The disease has
been greatly diminished through mosquito control and vaccination, although
sporadic outbreaks still occur. The severity of illness can range from a mild
self-limited viral syndrome to a fatal hemorrhagic fever [95]. After an incuba-
tion period of several days, symptoms begin as fever, headache, andmyalgias.
Conjunctivitis, relative bradycardia, and leukopeniamay be present. Jaundice
occurs secondary to hepatitis, and gastrointestinal bleeding may also occur.
Death can occur 7 to 10 days after onset. Treatment of yellow fever is support-
ive. The illness is preventablewith the attenuated 17Dvaccine,whichproduces
immunity in approximately 95% of those vaccinated.
Tick-borne encephalitis occurs in many areas of Europe and Asia. Infec-
tion can also occur from consumption of unpasteurized milk products. Most
infections are asymptomatic or only mildly symptomatic, but a small frac-
tion of infected individuals can develop encephalitis. Only approximately
1% of encephalitis cases are fatal, mostly in elderly individuals [96]. No spe-
cific therapy exists for flavivirus encephalitis.
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis has become a significant problem in
many areas of the world over the past several decades. Although illness pro-
gression and person-to-person transmission occur slowly, the ability to dis-
seminate through aerosol and difficulty treating multidrug-resistant strains
could make the organism attractive as a bioweapon. Treatment options
for highly resistant strains are severely limited [97].Summary
Various agents have potential for use as weapons of bioterrorism.
Knowledge of the likely organisms may be useful in preparations to mitigate
the effects of a bioterrorism event. Recognizing the clinical presentation of
these organisms could help physicians identify infection quickly, allowing
more appropriate management and possible prophylaxis of other individ-
uals who may have been exposed. Although many of these agents do not
have specific treatments, those that do are important to recognize. Which
infections require isolation is also important to know because of potential
for person-to-person spread.
183BIOLOGICAL TERRORISMIf a bioterrorism event occurs, the expertise of emergency physicians and
infectious disease specialists will be critical to mitigate the effects of the di-
saster. Emergency physicians will be on the front line when large numbers of
ill and potentially contagious patients present for care. Infectious disease
specialists will be essential in providing expertise for specialized diagnostic
testing, identifying treatment options when resources may be limited, and
advising on infection control and prophylaxis. Disaster planning for bioter-
rorism should incorporate consideration of surge capacity, infection control,
and mobilization of resources for vaccination, antimicrobial treatment, and
prophylaxis for large numbers of people.References
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